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Abstract
Purpose – We investigate the extent and the human-capital determinants of
low-wage mobility for labour market entrants, in the UK and Germany.
Design/methodology/approach – Using panel data for the UK (BHPS)
and Germany (GSOEP), we apply a competing-risks duration model that al-
lows us to study transitions from low pay to competing destination states:
higher pay, self-employment, unemployment and inactivity. Unobserved het-
erogeneity is tackled by a non-parametric mass-point approach.
Findings – We find that low pay is only a temporary state for most young job
starters. However, there is a small group of job starters that is caught in a trap
of low pay, unemployment or inactivity. In the UK, job starters escape from
low pay mainly by developing firm-specific skills. In Germany, involvement in
formal vocational training and the attainment of apprenticeship qualifications
account for low pay exits.
Originality/value – Over the past decades, unemployment and low-wage
employment have emerged as major challenges facing young labour market
entrants. While most empirical studies focus exclusively on the transition
from low pay to high pay, we show that a significant percentage of young
entrants are caught in a low-pay - non-employment trap. Moreover, we show
that, depending on the institutional context, different types of human capital
investments can account for a successful low-pay exit.
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1 Introduction
Over the past decades, the issue of the transition from education to work has gained
increasing attention in the economic literature (Ryan, 2001). This is not without
reason: in OECD countries, the youth unemployment rate increased from 12.3% to
13.4% between 1990 and 2004 (OECD, 2005), and the relative earnings of youths
decreased by some 9 percentage points between the 1970s and the 1990s (OECD,
2006). Previous research on the school-to-work transition has scrutinized issues such
as the labour force participation, the unemployment risk, the job and occupational
mobility as well as the job quality of young job starters (Ryan, 2001; Hannan et al.,
1997). Other studies have focused on the consequences of labour market entry in
flexible jobs (Scherer, 2004; de Grip and Wolbers, 2006). However, no research
has been devoted to the wage and employment consequences of entering the labour
market in a low-paid job. From an economic perspective this is an important issue:
a short low-pay spell at the start of the career indicates temporary labour market
adjustments, but long spells of low-pay employment reveal an imbalance between
the supply and the demand of skills.
The aim of this paper is twofold: first, we investigate the low-wage mobility of
male labour market entrants to higher pay, self-employment, unemployment and
inactivity in a competing-risks setting.[1] For this purpose, we apply a discrete-time
duration model that accounts for unobserved heterogeneity (unobserved individual
differences in abilities). Low pay is defined as an hourly wage level below two-thirds
of the median wage. Secondly, we assess the effect of two types of human capital –
general and firm-specific human capital – on the low-wage mobility of labour market
entrants. We investigate to what extent general skills acquired through education
and formal vocational training, on the one hand, and skills acquired ‘on-the-job’,
on the other hand, can account for low-pay mobility. The distinction between both
types of skills is not trivial because economic theory suggests that a combination
of a sorting explanation and a human capital explanation are relevant for the early
careers of labour market entrants (Weiss, 1995). Employers have imperfect informa-
tion on the productivity of labour market entrants. Therefore, as the sorting model
would suggest, even highly-educated young workers may enter the labour market in
a low-wage job. However, all workers can potentially acquire new skills. Thus, as
the human capital model suggests, even the low-educated labour market entrants
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may invest in on-the-job training and earn a higher wage.
We use data from two countries with different institutional characteristics with
respect to the school-to-work transition: the UK, which has a relatively weak link
between education and the labour market, and Germany, which has a highly strat-
ified educational and occupational system, and a highly regulated labour market
(de Grip and Wolbers, 2006). Our analysis is therefore illustrative of how various
forms of human capital can account for low-pay mobility in different institutional
settings.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the relationship
between human capital and wage dynamics for labour market entrants. This section
also discusses the role of institutional differences between the UK and Germany that
could affect the school-to-work transition. In Section 3, the econometric model is
described. The data used for the estimation is discussed in Section 4. Section 5
presents the results of the estimations. Conclusions are drawn in Section 6.
2 Human capital, sorting and labour market en-
try
Theoretical background
Information on the productivity of a worker is imperfect. Therefore, it is not possible
for employers to accurately assess the productivity of newly hired employees. This is
especially true in the case of school leavers, as they lack labour market experience.
Although employers use educational attainment as a signal of their productivity
(Spence, 1973), not all uncertainty can be immediately resolved. In such a case, the
employer may offer an initial wage that is lower than the marginal productivity until
additional information on abilities is revealed (Farber and Gibbons, 1996). This is
usually linked to a probation period, which discourages workers with low unobserved
abilities from applying for the job, and can be used to ‘sort’ high-productivity work-
ers (Weiss, 1995; Wang and Weiss, 1998). Lange (2007) suggests that it takes an
employer three years to resolve 50% of the initial uncertainty about the worker’s
productivity. During this period of uncertainty, a highly-skilled worker may be get-
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ting a low wage. After this period, the employer has gained more information on
the worker’s productivity, possibly leading to a wage increase for high-productivity
workers. In fact, this wage increase may be quite large. Loh (1994) finds that wage
growth in jobs with a probationary period is considerably higher than in jobs with-
out probation. He suggests that on-the-job training is an important component of
the probation period.[2] In contrast, low-productivity labour market entrants will
remain trapped in low pay or will be forced into unemployment or inactivity.
The aforementioned sorting explanation may seem plausible for a highly-educated
worker who enters the labour market in a low-paid job. For low-skilled job starters,
however, a human capital explanation seems more credible, as they may improve
their general or firm-specific skills in the early stages of their careers, thus raising
their wages.
Empirical studies, however, provide conflicting evidence as to the degree to which
the sorting explanation and the human capital explanation can account for job
mobility in different countries. Chevalier et al. (2004) suggest that there is little
evidence in support of the sorting explanation in the UK, where job tenure is shown
to be the main determinant of upward mobility (Gosling et al., 1997). In Germany,
apprenticeship plays a crucial role for the earnings progression of young workers
(Harhoff and Kane, 1997; Ryan, 2001). These studies, however, are not specific to
labour market entrants. While an assessment of the relevance of the sorting and
the human capital model goes beyond the scope of this study[3], we do combine and
exploit the two models to identify the main predictors of low-pay mobility of school
leavers, i.e. education as a measure of general human capital, and training and tenure
as measures of firm-specific human capital. In addition, as the sorting explanation
points to the importance of unobserved (to the firm and to the researcher) ability
and effort, these will also be accounted for in our panel data analysis.
The reward of human capital in the UK and Germany
The effect of human capital on low-pay mobility is investigated in two countries: the
UK and Germany. These two countries were chosen as they differ considerably with
respect to the institutions that regulate the school-to-work transition. The German
labour market is strongly regulated by collective bargaining, which covers more than
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80% of West German workers. Furthermore, the link between the education system
and the labour market is strong (Scherer, 2004; de Grip and Wolbers, 2006). The
‘key’ feature of this strong link is apprenticeship. More than 50% of young people
go through a period of apprenticeship lasting up to three years (Ryan, 2001). Ap-
prenticeship is a ‘dual system’, in the sense that apprentices are employed by firms
while attending courses at vocational schools. As employers are directly involved
in the provision and delivery of apprenticeships, these provide direct information
on the productivity of workers in a particular occupation. For this reason, appren-
ticeships develop skills that are transferable across jobs and employers (Hannan
et al., 1997; Ryan, 2001), which differentiates them from typical on-the-job training.
Empirical evidence on apprenticeships is in line with the considerations mentioned
above. Approximately half of the apprenticeships lead to regular jobs (CPB, 1997).
Especially apprentices trained in large firms are more likely to experience a smooth
transition to regular employment (Winkelmann, 1996). Although most job matches
between the ex-apprentices and their employer terminate within five years after
completion of the apprenticeship period, these ex-apprentices enjoy a higher wage
growth by changing jobs (Dustmann et al., 1997; Franz et al., 2000). Therefore, in
our analysis for Germany, we consider apprenticeship as a form of general human
capital rather than a form of firm-specific human capital.
In the UK, the education and vocational training system is less strongly geared
towards the labour market than in Germany (Hannan et al., 1997). Compared to
the German system, the UK education system is more flexible and only weakly
stratified. The apprenticeship system is less widespread in the UK, and it is as-
sociated with a lower status than in Germany (Brauns et al., 2000).[4] There are
also more opportunities to move across vocational training and university educa-
tion than in Germany (Mu¨ller and Shavit, 1998). The British labour market is
dominated by market forces rather than by statutory regulations. In particular,
collective bargaining is less widespread and unionization rates are low, with only
22% of private sector workers covered by collective bargaining. In addition, mini-
mum wage regulation was absent from 1993 until 1999, when a national minimum
wage was introduced. As from 1999, two minimum wage rates were set, a rate for
workers older than 21 years and a lower rate for workers aged 18-21. In 2004, an
even lower rate was introduced to cover workers aged 16-17. Job mobility rates
are typically higher and entrepreneurship more common than in Germany. Conse-
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quently, the British employment system is more open than the German one, and low
pay is observed among all categories of employees rather than just among labour
market entrants. Therefore, skills acquired on the job are a more important factor
for earnings progression.[5]
Table 1: Indicators of youth employment and unemployment
(in percentages)
Germany UK
1995 2005 1995 2005
Low-pay incidence
15-29 38.2 28.3
Total (15-64) 14.3 15.7 20.9 19.4
Low-pay persistence a 15-29 12.7 9.2
Labour force
participation rate
15-24 56.8 53.5 74.4 69.0
25-34 90.2 90.6 94.1 92.0
Total (15-64) 79.5 80.6 84.7 82.8
Unemployment
rate
15-24 8.3 16.1 17.9 13.4
25-34 7.0 12.0 10.1 4.7
Total (15-64) 7.2 11.5 10.2 5.1
Share of long-term
unemployment (> 1 year)
15-24 25.2 32.0 30.5 17.3
Total (15-64) 45.9 53.8 49.6 26.2
Share of temporary
employment
15-24 41.6 60.4 13.4 11.3
Total (15-64) 9.9 14.0 6.2 5.2
Share of part-time
employment
15-24 31.8 37.7 41.6 40.5
Total (15-64) 12.6 17.5 17.7 22.1
Source: OECD (2008), OECD online statistical database, OECD (1996) and Euro-
pean Commission (2004).
a This refers to the 5-year period 1997-2001 for Germany and 2000-2005 for the UK.
The two countries’ different patterns of youth labour market entry are projected
in Table 1. This table illustrates that, in the UK, youth labour force participation is
high and unemployment is decreasing. More importantly, long-term unemployment
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decreased sharply between 1995 and 2005, in contrast to the rising unemployment
rates in other OECD countries. However, the British labour market does not perform
well with respect to low-pay mobility. Low-pay persistence and increased mobility
between low pay and unemployment is well-established in the UK (Stewart and
Swaffield, 1999; Dickens, 2000; Cappellari and Jenkins, 2004; Stewart, 2007). In
Germany, the youth labour market participation rate is lower than in the UK, and
unemployment increased from 7.7% in 1992 to 11.7% in 2005, gradually becoming
more persistent. Temporary contracts are more widespread than in the UK, as
employers try to avoid the strict arrangements that regulate permanent contracts.
In both countries, low pay is quite common among workers below the age of 30, but
it is more persistent in Germany.
3 A duration model for low-pay mobility
Extending the standard approach that focuses on mobility from low pay to high
pay, we apply a discrete-time duration model for young low-paid labour market
entrants with four competing risks: moving to higher pay, to unemployment, to self-
employment or to inactivity. Remaining in low pay is the reference state.[6] We use
a discrete-time model rather than a continuous-time model because our data were
derived from yearly observations. Let Pm(Xit, t) be the probability that individual
i escapes the low-pay status to a status m after t years. Let Xit denote a matrix of
covariates for individual i after being at risk for t years. The transition probability
is specified by the following multinomial logit model:
Pm(Xit, t) =
exp (b′m0 + b
′m
1 ln t+ b
′m
2 Xit)
1 +
4∑
n=1
exp(b′n0 + b′
n
1 ln t+ b
′n
2Xit)
, (1)
for 1 ≤ m ≤ n and P0(Xit, t) = 1 −
4∑
m=1
Pm(Xit, t). b
m
0 ,b
m
1 ,b
m
2 are vectors of
coefficients to be estimated. Therefore, when analyzing the first low-pay spell, the
likelihood contribution of an individual for whom no event has taken place until
6
Ti − 1 is:
Li =
[
Ti−1∏
t=1
P0(Xit, t)
][
P0(XiTi , Ti)
](1− 4∑
m=1
δtim
)
4∏
m=1
[Pm(XiTi , Ti)]
δtim , (2)
where δtim =
1 if dti = m0 if dti = 0 ,
and dti is a censoring indicator.
However, none of the exit states can be considered as absorbing. Individuals who
move out of low pay could re-enter low pay, and consequently experience more than
one low-pay spell. Therefore, we extend the first-spell model to a multiple-spells
discrete-time duration model which is identified under weaker assumptions (van
den Berg, 2001).[7] Let Ki denote the spell number in which an individual is last
observed. The likelihood contribution of an individual for whom no event has taken
place until Tki − 1 in spell k is:
L′i =
Ki∏
k=1
Lki . (3)
where Lki is the likelihood contribution of individual i in spell k as defined in equa-
tion 2.
Correcting for unobserved heterogeneity is essential in multiple-spells models
in order to control for the correlation between spells within the same individual.
Moreover, duration models that fail to account for unobserved heterogeneity run
the risk of overestimating negative duration dependence (or underestimating pos-
itive duration dependence) as well as underestimating the effect of time-varying
covariates (Lancaster, 1990; Vermunt, 1997). Finally, accounting for unobservables
also controls for possible dependance between the competing risks (Vermunt, 1997).
We control for unobserved heterogeneity using the non-parametric mass-points ap-
proach introduced by Heckman and Singer (1984).
According to this approach, the transitions to different states vary between a
finite number of mass-points or groups of people. These J groups are not defined
a priori, but they refer to groups of people who share similar levels of unobserved
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characteristics, reflecting different probabilities of exiting low pay, e.g. those with
high levels of unobserved abilities and high exit probability to high pay, and those
with low ability levels and low exit probability. This methodology allows both the
intercept and the slopes (the coefficients) to vary across the J mass-points. The
slopes are allowed to vary across groups (mass-points) as the returns to specific
observed characteristics may be different across mass-points. Such a model is known
as a random-slope model. Each group is indexed by  in the relevant parameters.
The transition probability for individual i that belongs to group  is given by:
Pm(Xit, tk, ) =
exp
(
b′m0 + b
′m
1 ln tk + b
′m
2Xit
)
1 +
3∑
n=1
exp(b′n0 + b′
n
1 ln tk + b
′n
2Xit)
(4)
where tk is the duration in spell k.
We base our choice for the number of groups on the Log Likelihood, the Akaike
(AIC) and the Bayesian (BIC) Information criteria.[8] The likelihood contribution
of an individual belonging to group  is obtained as follows:
L′′i =
J∑
=1
L′i| pi , (5)
where pi is the probability of belonging to group  and the likelihood Li| is defined
as in equation (3), but with Pm(Xit, t) replaced by Pm(Xit, tk, ).
Endogeneity of initial conditions will be a potential source of bias for our analysis.
However, as our sample includes only people who gain their first job within the ref-
erence period, the problem of initial conditions does not emerge from left-censoring:
labour market entrants are observed as soon as they earn their first wage. Never-
theless, there may still be some endogeneity if the unobserved characteristics that
determine the initial pay level are correlated with low-pay transitions. Moreover,
the sample of individuals starting employment may be selective. Individuals who
expect to find a low-paid job may postpone labour market entry by enrolling in an
educational or training program – thus increasing their human capital – or even by
remaining jobless until labour market opportunities improve. Although it is fairly
easy to account for this in a single risk model (Stewart and Swaffield, 1999), fully
controlling for self-selection in a competing risks framework is a complex endeavour.
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In order to reduce bias from the possible endogeneity of initial conditions, we include
a number of covariates that may partly control for this problem: a dummy variable
for calendar time that picks up the effect of the business cycle and its resulting
effect on postponement of labour market entry, as well as a dummy for a spell of
non-employment prior to labour market entry that captures the effect of the initial
match between the supply and the demand of skills. However, if this endogeneity is
not fully controlled for resulting estimates may well contain some bias.
4 Data and Main Concepts
For the UK, we use the 1991-2005 waves of the British Household Panel Survey
(BHPS). For Germany, we make use of the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP)
for the years 1984-2005. We only use data for former West Germany, as the East
German labour market presents considerable differences.[9]
Sample selection
Since our focus is on labour market entrants, we selected males aged 16-30 who are
entering the labour market for the first time in the period under scrutiny. Workers
are considered as labour market entrants in year t if they report paid employment as
their main activity for the first time in t, and education as their main activity in the
years t−1, t−2 or t−3. The majority of them are school leavers. Seasonal or part-
time jobs combined with education were not taken into account. More specifically,
we based the selection of our sample on the self-reported employment status. For
every labour market entrant, we include information on all his observed low-wage
spells. Our data is organized in a person-year file.
Female employees were excluded as they tend to have more heterogeneous career
paths than males, especially because childbirth is a major event affecting their labour
supply decision (Dex et al., 1998). Moreover, this decision has been shown to cru-
cially depend on the country’s institutional support for mothers (Uunk et al., 2005),
and to be jointly dependent on the labour supply of the male partner (Powell, 2002).
In addition, while male workers tend to work full-time, the females’ supply decision
generally has implications for the number of hours worked (Paull, 2008). Controlling
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for the factors affecting these different career paths, the joint supply decision or the
decision to work part-time is beyond the scope of this study.
In Germany, many young people enter the labour market through an appren-
ticeship, which is part of the education system. For this reason, we only consider
them as labour market entrants after they have completed their apprenticeship. The
possession of apprenticeship qualifications is controlled for in the model. Although
apprenticeship qualifications also exist in the UK, no individuals in the British sam-
ple reported such a qualification. This is probably due to the fact that the British
apprenticeship system was deregulated in the 1980s, and therefore the number of
apprentices among young workers decreased considerably.
Low-pay
The main economic variable is the gross hourly wage. Since no information on the
hourly wage was directly collected for all the waves in the surveys, we derived it
by dividing the salary in the month prior to the survey by the number of hours
usually worked per week multiplied by 4.33. Following standard practice in the low-
pay literature, the low-pay threshold is set to two-thirds of the median hourly wage
(for a discussion about low-pay thresholds, see OECD, 1996). We also performed a
sensitivity analysis, using the first quartile of the wage distribution as the low-pay
threshold. This did not affect the results in any significant way. Figure 1 plots the
lower part of the cumulative distribution of hourly wages for male workers along
with the low-pay threshold in the year 2000. For the UK, we also plot the two
statutory hourly minimum wages: the rate for workers above the age of 21 as well
as the rate for workers aged 18 to 21. The minimum wage line only appears in the
UK because there is no national minimum wage in Germany. Our low-pay threshold
‘cuts’ the distribution at a higher wage level than the minimum wage. In the UK,
about 21% of the workers are low-paid, while the relevant proportion in Germany
is approximately 19%.
Three measures of human capital are included in the model. First, general human
capital is captured by the highest education level attained by the individual (lower
than secondary school, secondary school or tertiary education). Second, appren-
ticeship (dummy variable) is also a measure of general human capital in Germany.
10
66% of
median
MW
21+
MW 18−21
0
10
20
30
40
50
Cu
m
ul
at
ive
 p
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
of
 w
ag
e 
ea
rn
er
s
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Wage level
United Kingdom
66% of median
0
10
20
30
40
50
Cu
m
ul
at
ive
 p
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
of
 w
ag
e 
ea
rn
er
s
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Wage level
Germany
Figure 1: Distribution of gross hourly wages, males aged 16-55, year 2000. The
minimum wage ‘MW 21+’ applies to workers above the age of 21, while the minimum
wage ‘MW 18-21 applies to workers aged 18 to 21.
Finally, firm-specific human capital is measured by the occurrence of formal train-
ing (dummy variable for participation in formal training scheme in year prior to the
survey) and tenure (in moths) in the current job. The models we estimated include
controls for age, marital status (dummy when legally married), firm size[10], sector
of industry (commercial services, industry, primary sector, non-commercial services
and public sector), part-time work (fewer than 35 hours per week), temporary con-
tract, white color workers, calendar time [11] and unemployment spells prior to the
first labour market entry.
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Table 2: Composition of the sample of low-paid labour market entrants, pooled
years
(in percentages)
UK Germany
Incidence of low paya 55.6 48.4
Average nr of spells 1.4 1.3
Mean low-pay
duration (in years)
2.9 1.9
Age
16-20 61.8 25.5
21-25 27.6 53.9
26-30 8.6 20.6
Married 5.0 12.9
Education
primary 23.2 28.6
secondary 54.6 65.0
tertiary 22.2 6.4
Training 32.1 44.7
Firm size
small 44.1 31.6
medium 26.7 30.4
large 29.2 38.0
Industrial sector
commercial ser-
vices
40.6 22.4
industry 23.5 46.9
primary sector 26.4 2.2
non-commercial
services
4.9 13.3
public sector 5.0 15.2
White collar 11.3 29.1
Part-time 10.0 12.0
Temporary contract 20.7 34.2
Non-employment spell 27.9 13.1
Apprenticeship - 68.6
(prior to labour market entry)
Cases 658 916
a This is the incidence of low pay among all labour market entrants.
Note: The percentages for age, marital status, education, training, firm size,
industrial sector, white collar, part-time employment and temporary contract
refer to the first year of the first low-pay spell of individuals. The mean low-
pay duration refers to all the spells.
Low-paid entrants
Our sample consists of 658 individuals for the UK and 916 individuals for Germany.
Descriptive statistics for our sample are given in Table 2. This table indicates that12
the incidence of low pay among labour market entrants is higher in the UK than in
Germany. The extended mean duration of low pay is longer in the UK (2.9 years)
than in Germany (1.9 years). Although our data for Germany cover a considerably
longer time period than our data for the UK, the average number of low-wage spells
that an individual experiences is similar in both countries (1.3 and 1.4, respectively).
The fact that the probability of experiencing more than one low-wage spell is not
zero clearly indicates that low pay cannot be considered as an absorbing state for
labour market entrants.[12]
The composition of our sample shows that the low-paid job starter is usually
single, younger than 25 years of age, with secondary school qualifications, working
as a blue-collar worker on a temporary contract in the commercial services sector or
in the industry sector. Some cross-country differences emerge. In the UK, more than
a quarter of our sample experienced a period of non-employment after completing
his education and before getting his first job. The relevant percentage is lower in
Germany (13.1%). Low-paid labour market entrants are on average younger in the
UK than in Germany. As expected, the distribution of the British sample is more
uniform across education levels than in Germany. Compared to the UK, German
low-paid entrants more often work in the industry sector.
5 Results
Exits from low pay
For 658 workers in our British sample, we observe 1,528 transitions, while for the
916 workers in our German sample we observe 1,821 transitions. The year-to-year
transition rates are reported in Table 3. As the table shows, low-pay persistence
is higher in the UK than in Germany. The earnings of German low-paid labour
market entrants cross more often the low-pay threshold than their British colleagues’
earnings. This suggests that low-paid job starters in Germany experience more
upward wage mobility. As expected, transitions from low pay to unemployment are
more common in the UK than in Germany.
Although we expected transitions to self-employment to take place more often in
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Table 3: Overall year-to-year transition rate, pooled years
(in percentages)
UK Germany
Remaining in low pay 58.7 42.6
Higher pay 28.0 39.7
Unemployment 9.2 6.9
Self-employment 2.5 2.5
Inactivity 1.6 8.3
Total 100 100
Individuals 658 916
Transitions 1,528 1,821
the liberal labour market of the UK than in the regulated German labour market,
transition rates to self-employment do not differ between these two countries. An
explanation for this is provided by Thurik (2003), who suggests that the favorable
conditions for entrepreneurship in the UK mainly benefit large firms. Therefore, for
individuals starting their employment career in a low-paid job there is no ‘easy way
out’ to self-employment by starting a small business. Transitions to inactivity are
more common in Germany.
Figure 2 plots the cumulative probability of staying in a low paid job after t
years for three educational levels. For all educational levels, the exit rate out of
low pay is larger in Germany than in the UK. Contrary to our expectations, no
obvious differences between education groups emerge in Germany. However, in the
UK, secondary and tertiary education graduates have a better chance of escaping
from low pay than the low educated.
Results from the competing-risks model
The competing-risks analysis was performed separately for the UK and Germany.
The model that best accounts for unobserved heterogeneity is the two-mass-points
model.[13] In both countries, we allowed the main variables of interest, namely dura-
tion dependence, number of spells, education, training, apprenticeship and tenure,
to have a different effect across the two groups (mass-points). Before interpreting the
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Figure 2: Cumulative probability of staying in low pay by education level
estimates for these variables, we discuss our findings with respect to unobserved het-
erogeneity. This feature of the approach developed by Heckman and Singer (1984)
has rarely been exploited, although it provides very useful information. The two-
mass-points model suggests the existence of two types of labour market entrants,
each with common unobserved characteristics: one group with high unobserved
ability and high exit probability to higher pay (‘movers’), and one group with low
unobserved ability and low exit probability to higher pay (‘stayers’).
Both groups’ marginal probabilities of exiting low pay are presented in Table 4.
These probabilities are derived from equation 4 by aggregating over the values of the
covariates in our sample. In accordance with Table 3, the transition probability to
higher pay is higher in Germany than in the UK. In Germany, the weighted average
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Table 4: Group size and marginal transition probabilities in the two classes
UK Germany
Movers Stayers Movers Stayers
Remaining in low pay 0.383 0.620 0.429 0.403
(0.036) (0.016) (0.018) (0.035)
Higher pay 0.464 0.242 0.450 0.273
(0.033) (0.015) (0.018) (0.048)
Unemployed 0.076 0.096 0.041 0.145
(0.023) (0.010) (0.008) (0.026)
Self-employment 0.042 0.026 0.029 0.021
(0.007) (0.005) (0.008) (0.009)
Inactivity 0.034 0.016 0.050 0.158
(0.015) (0.004) (0.012) (0.028)
Total 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Group Size 0.261 0.739 0.686 0.314
of the marginal transition probabilities is .39, while in the UK, it is .30. In the
UK, the ‘stayers’ form the largest group (74% of the sample). For this group, the
probability of remaining in low pay is .62. In contrast, in Germany, the group of
stayers is smaller (31%). The staying probability of this group is also lower than in
the UK (.40), and it does not differ much from the corresponding probability among
‘movers’. However, German low-paid workers in this group have high transition
probabilities to unemployment (.15) and inactivity (.16).
Similar cross-country differences also emerge for the group of movers. In the UK,
this group (26% of the sample) is smaller than the group of stayers, but it is highly
likely to move to higher pay (.46). For the group of movers, the marginal transition
probability to self-employment (.04) is slightly higher than the corresponding ob-
served probability of Table 3. However, it still indicates that self-employment is not
a ‘way out’ of low pay for British labour market entrants. In Germany, the group of
movers is the largest group (69% of the sample), but its staying probability is larger
than the corresponding probability for the stayers (.42). What differentiates movers
from stayers is their higher transitions probability to higher pay (.45) and their low
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transition probability to unemployment (.04) and to inactivity (.05). In contrast
to Germany, in the UK, marginal transition probabilities to unemployment do not
differ considerably between the 2 groups. Based on the predicted probabilities of
our model, we made an out-of-sample prediction concerning the expected duration
of low pay. We found that, in the UK, an individual with average characteristics
entering the labour market in a low-paid job, has a probability of 79% to be still
in low pay employment after a year, and 58% after two years. After three years,
this probability drops to 40%. In accordance with our descriptive findings, the rele-
vant survival probabilities are lower for a German low-paid job starter with average
characteristics. After one year in low pay, his survival probability is 59%, after two
years it is 38%, while it drops to 26% after 3 years.[14]
The estimates from the competing risks model are presented in Tables 5 and
6. Since remaining in low pay is treated as the reference category, the estimates
in the tables concern the transitions to higher pay, unemployment, self-employment
and inactivity. Only the model estimates for duration dependence, the spell number
and the human capital variables are reported.[15] We tested several specifications of
duration dependence (linear, nominal, quadratic), with the logarithmic specification
performing best.
The results indicate no significant effect of duration dependence for transitions to
higher pay in either of the two countries. For self-employment, we only find negative
duration dependence for the British stayers, while for transitions to inactivity we
find negative duration dependence for both British stayers and German movers. We
conclude that the longer the duration of the low-pay spell, the lower the likelihood
that a British stayer becomes self-employed or inactive. For a German mover, we
conclude that long low-pay spells decrease the likelihood of becoming inactive.
General and firm-specific human capital accounts for a large share of the indi-
vidual differences in exit probabilities. From the discussion in Section 2, we expect
the main determinant of low-pay exits to be general human capital in Germany and
firm-specific human capital in the UK. Although our findings are partly in line with
this expectation, the picture that emerges is more complex. In the countries under
scrutiny, different types of human capital have a different effect on exit probabilities
in the groups of movers and stayers. More specifically, in the UK and for the group
of movers, only firm-specific skills affect the transition probability to higher pay:
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Table 5: Parameters of the competing-risks model for exit from low pay - the UK
(Main Coefficients for the random slopes for movers and sayers)
‘Movers’ ‘Stayers’
Higher Unemplo- Self-
Inactivity
Higher Unemplo- Self-
Inactivity
pay yment employment pay yment employment
Log duration
0.395 -1.405 -2.203 1.121 -0.063 -0.451 -1.993∗∗∗ -2.284∗∗∗
(0.453) (1.059) (1.413) (0.891) (0.158) (0.240) (0.715) (0.880)
Number of spell
0.989∗ -4.374 -17.774 1.398 -0.031 0.074 0.150 -7.266
(0.584) (8.359) (19.021) (0.932) (0.150) (0.235) (0.426) (19.510)
Education (reference: low)
High-School
-0.701 -2.398∗∗∗ 22.877 -1.765 0.770∗∗∗ -0.209 -0.072 -0.018
(0.889) (0.959) (14.211) (1.688) (0.270) (0.290) (0.467) (0.613)
Tertiary
0.532 -1.495 39.242∗∗ 0.962 0.833∗∗∗ -0.229 -0.465 -19.167
(1.022) (1.205) (20.201) (1.485) (0.285) (0.341) (0.763) (36.931)
Training
-0.877 -0.431 -13.491∗∗ 0.779 0.420∗∗ -0.826∗∗ -0.605 -2.736
(0.567) (0.798) (6.708) (0.788) (0.206) (0.333) (0.501) (2.131)
Tenure
0.028∗∗ 0.029 0.398∗∗ 0.030 -0.010∗∗ -0.016∗∗ -0.010 0.022
(0.014) (0.022) (0.166) (0.021) (0.004) (0.007) (0.017) (0.016)
Constant
-2.496∗∗∗ 4.729 -23.531 -6.238∗∗∗ -2.659∗∗∗ -0.800 -1.675∗∗ 3.791
(0.401) (0.486) (0.752) (19.513) (0.401) (0.486) (0.752) (19.513)
Remaining in low pay is the reference state. Control variables: age, marital status, firm size, sector of industry, part-time
work, temporary contract, white color worker, calendar time and unemployment spells prior to the first labour market entry.
Standard errors between brackets.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
the longer the tenure, the higher the likelihood of moving to higher pay. Young
low-paid workers can increase their wage above the low-pay threshold by develop-
ing their skills in the internal labour market, a finding that is in line with Gosling
et al. (1997). For the British movers, tenure increases also the likelihood of mov-
ing to self-employment. For the stayers, findings are in accordance with the vast
literature on low-wage dynamics (see, for example, Stewart and Swaffield, 1999; Cap-
pellari, 2000). Secondary or higher education and job-specific training significantly
increase the likelihood of moving to higher pay, while tenure has a negative effect.
Moreover, for the stayers, training and tenure decrease the likelihood of a transi-
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Table 6: Parameters of the competing-risks model for exit from low pay - Germany
(Main Coefficients for the random slopes for movers and sayers)
‘Movers’ ‘Stayers’
Higher Unemplo- Self-
Inactivity
Higher Unemplo- Self-
Inactivity
pay yment employment pay yment employment
Log duration
-0.132 -0.206 0.420 -1.104∗∗∗ -0.151 1.404∗ -0.684 -0.152
(0.136) (0.299) (0.383) (0.349) (1.409) (0.755) (1.678) (1.126)
Number of spell
-0.023 0.059 -1.321∗∗ 0.218 -0.653 0.317 0.923 -1.439
(0.145) (0.298) (0.575) (0.290) (0.853) (0.546) (1.480) (3.372)
Education (reference: low)
High-School
-0.146 -0.738∗∗ 0.989∗ -0.138 4.729∗∗∗ 1.171 4.381∗ 8.187
(0.151) (0.307) (0.576) (0.273) (1.610) (0.934) (2.489) (10.914)
Tertiary
-0.151 -1.533∗ 0.639∗ -1.233 -0.451 1.685 4.134 11.109
(0.285) (0.924) (0.807) (0.823) (2.346) (1.526) (3.787) (12.434)
Training
0.358∗∗ -0.569 -7.553 -0.309 -1.714 2.280∗∗ 3.247 9.616
(0.161) (0.571) (15.436) (0.369) (1.766) (1.052) (3.036) (7.247)
Apprenticeship
0.651∗∗∗ -0.317 0.134 0.317 -7.424∗∗∗ -5.040∗∗∗ -4.080∗ -1.854
(0.164) (0.341) (0.487) (0.294) (2.278) (1.780) (2.385) (7.705)
Tenure
0.004∗ -0.001 0.007 0.002 -0.099∗∗∗ -0.067∗∗∗ -0.071∗∗ -0.022
(0.002) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.046) (0.021) (0.036) (0.029)
Constant
-0.942∗∗∗ -1.482∗∗ -1.281 -1.562∗∗∗ 4.950∗∗∗ 3.150 -1.865 -11.351
(0.336) (0.623) (1.096) (0.572) (3.176) (2.149) (5.244) (16.152)
Remaining in low pay is the reference state. Control variables: age, marital status, firm size, sector of industry, part-time
work, temporary contract, white color worker, calendar time and unemployment spells prior to the first labour market entry.
Standard errors between brackets.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
tion to unemployment. Therefore, for the group of movers, firm-specific skills (as
measured by long tenure) stimulate exit to better earnings, while for the group of
stayers, this may be achieved by having a secondary school diploma or a higher edu-
cation degree or by job-specific training. For a highly-educated stayer, entering the
labour market in a low-paid job seems to be a temporary event due to a short-run
mismatch. This finding can be adequately explained by a sorting explanation, such
as the existence of a probation period.
The picture is different in Germany. For the group of German movers, the edu-
cation level does not have a significant effect on transitions to higher pay. Having a
secondary school diploma or a higher education degree (the latter is significant only
at the 10% level) decreases the likelihood of an exit to unemployment. In contrast,
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apprenticeship and job-related training are relevant, as they raise the likelihood of
increasing the wage above the low-pay threshold. Employer tenure also has a small
positive effect (although only significant at the 10% level). The finding that ed-
ucation does not improve the wage prospects of German labour market entrants
contradicts the findings of previous literature on low-wage dynamics (see, for exam-
ple, Cappellari, 2000). Even the scarce literature specifically focusing on low-pay
dynamics in Germany (Uhlendorff, 2006) suggests that higher education increases
the likelihood for a transition above the low-pay threshold. However, these studies
do not focus on labour market entrants. It seems that, for this group of workers,
skills acquired by formal education are mainly rewarded upon entering the labour
market.
As far as apprenticeship is concerned, the findings for the German movers suggest
that general human capital that is directly job-related – in the sense that it is
acquired during the dual training/work period and sometimes in the same firm where
the worker gets his first job – is crucial for moving out of low pay at the beginning
of the working career. For the German stayers, human capital does not seem to be
very effective in explaining low pay transitions. Only secondary school education
increases the likelihood of a transition out of low pay, while both apprenticeship and
tenure decrease this likelihood. In fact, they decrease the likelihood of a transition
to all competing states. At least for tenure, this indicates that the longer a German
stayer remains in a low-wage job, the more likely he is to remain ‘locked’ below the
low-pay threshold.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we investigated the extent and the human capital determinants of low-
wage mobility for labour market entrants in the UK and Germany. This subgroup of
wage earners has received little attention in the economic literature. We investigated
transitions from low pay to different destination states (higher pay, self-employment,
unemployment and inactivity), while controlling for unobserved characteristics, such
as ability. Combining the predictions of the human capital and the sorting model,
we assessed the role of two types of human capital – general and firm-specific – on
these transitions.
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As far as unobserved abilities are concerned, our competing-risks duration model
suggests the existence of two types of low-paid job starters: movers, with a high
transition probability to higher pay, and stayers with a low transition probability to
higher pay and/or with a high transition probability to unemployment. Although
the marginal transition probability to higher pay in the group of movers is similar
in both countries (.45 in Germany and .46 in the UK), the group of movers is
larger in Germany than in the UK (69% and 26%, respectively). If we also consider
the marginal transition probabilities to higher pay among the stayers, then we can
conclude that more upward mobility opportunities exist for low-paid labour market
entrants in Germany than in the UK. Furthermore, in neither country does self-
employment offer a ‘way out’ of low pay.
The results of the model indicate that low-wage job starters face a different
challenges in the two countries under scrutiny. In the UK, in line with previous
studies, strong low-wage persistence was found for the group of stayers, as the rele-
vant staying probability is .62. In Germany, however, the stayers are at greater risk
of unemployment (transition probability .15) and inactivity (transition probability
.16) than of low-pay persistence.
In view of the differences in school-to-work institutions between the two coun-
tries, we expected human capital characteristics to explain the low-pay mobility
of labour market entrants. Formal education and apprenticeship were expected to
be more decisive in the low-pay transitions in Germany, while training and tenure
were expected to be more important in the UK. However, the picture emerging
from our findings is more complex. In the UK, firm-specific skills, as measured by
tenure, account for low-pay exits in the group of movers, while both general skills, as
measured by education, and firm-specific skills, as measured by on-the-job training,
account for low-pay exits in the group of stayers. Therefore, for the UK, a com-
bination of a sorting explanation and a human capital explanation seems to offer
the most accurate account of the low-wage mobility of labour market entrants. For
some highly-educated job starters, a low-pay spell at the beginning of their working
career is a temporary incident, possibly related to a probation period. Other labour
market entrants manage to escape low pay by investing in firm-specific skills, which
points to a direct human capital explanation. Unfortunately, our data does not
allow to investigate this effect in more detail.
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Surprisingly, the educational level appears to have little effect on the low-pay
mobility of German labour market entrants. Apprenticeship and training positively
affect the low-wage mobility in the group of stayers. Therefore, a large part of
German young workers can benefit considerably from the German apprenticeship
system that provides skills transferable across employers (at least within the same
industry). It appears that upon entering the labour market, young German workers
are sorted into low-wage and high-wage jobs according to their educational level.
A learning effect, possibly related to a probation period, may be relevant to most
workers with apprenticeship qualifications. Surprisingly, little effect of human cap-
ital factors is found for the group of German stayers. For this group of workers,
having apprenticeship qualifications or long tenure in a low-wage job has a detri-
mental effect on labour market prospects. This is consistent with the segmentation
in the German labour market.
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Notes
[1]Our focus on male labour market entrants is motivated by the fact that female workers have
very different career paths that are greatly influenced by major life events such as childbirth, their
partner’s labour supply and the country’s institutional context.
[2]This is also true from a human capital perspective (Brown, 1989).
[3]See (Weiss, 1995) and Chevalier et al. (2004) for an assessment of these two explanations.
[4]This only applies after the deregulation of the UK labour market in the 1980s. The charac-
teristics of the countries presented here are not static. Marsden (1990), for example, suggests that
the UK labour market resembles the German one, as he uses data from the early 1980s.
[5]Gosling et al. (1997) find that job tenure is the most important determinant of low-pay tran-
sitions in the UK, and Belfield and Wei (2004) suggest that wage growth is higher for workers in
large firms (in which on the job learning is more common).
[6]We consider workers to be constrained in their transitions. More specifically, we assume that
all low-paid workers would like to move to higher pay, and that both staying in low pay and moving
to unemployment or inactivity are involuntary actions. Therefore, we can estimate the model in a
reduced form.
[7]A multiple-spell multiple-state approach in the framework of Gagliarducci (2005) would be
appropriate for our research question as this would allow us to investigate further processes such
as the low pay - unemployment cycle. However, in our sample there are very few sequences of the
type low pay - non employment - low pay which makes the implementation of the multiple-state
model infeasible.
[8]All estimations were carried out in Latent Gold (Vermunt and Magidson, 2008).
[9]The BHPS data (Taylor et al., 2006) were made available by the Data Archive at Essex
University. The GSOEP (Wagner et al., 1993) was provided by the German Institute for Economic
Research.
[10]We use dummies for small, medium and large firm. In the UK these three values refer to firms
with fewer than 25 employees, firms employing between 25 and 99 employees, and firms with more
than 100 employees. In Germany, they refer to firms with fewer than 20 employees, firms with
employing 20 and 199 employees and firms with 200 employees or more.
[11]Calendar time is useful to estimate a possible effect of the introduction of the minimum wage
in the UK, in 1999 as well as the sub-minimum wage for 16 and 17-year-old workers in 2004. Our
results indicate that none of the two calendar-time dummies suggest the existence of such an effect.
Although it is beyond the scope of this study to fully account for the effect of the different stages
in which a minimum wage was introduced in the UK, a possible explanation for the lack of effect
is that the minimum wage is set at a level significantly lower than the low-pay threshold.
[12]In both countries, the probability of re-entering low pay is approximately 10% for labour
market entrants.
[13]This choice was based on the log-likelihood, the AIC and the BIC fit measures. These measures
are not reported but are available from the authors on request.
[14]In a recent paper, Phimister et al. (2006) computed mean expected low pay durations for British
low-wage workers in a competing risks framework on the basis of a methodology developed by
Thomas (1996). While such computations are meaningful when the observed spells are sufficiently
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long, they are less meaningful in our case where the maximum duration of a low-pay spell is only
9 years in the UK and 13 years in Germany.
[15]The parameter estimates for the control variables are not reported. They are available from
the authors on request.
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